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Smart power is a not-so-new concept in global politics. In
fact, it was introduced in the early 1990s. Smart power is the
continuation of soft power as an alternative power that can change the
traditional paradigm about the balancing of “hard power” between
countries. Thus, smart power is a mixture of both hard and soft elements
of power.
Nevertheless, smart power has recently attracted more
studies and exploration, and smart power as a buzzword is becoming used
more often by countries’ elites and political leaders. Hillary Clinton,
for example, in her farewell address called for the need of smart power
for contemporary and future US foreign policy. She emphasized that it
was necessary not because US power was declining; rather, the power as
well as threats were diffusing and “the world becomes ever more
interdependent and interconnected”.
In Indonesia, smart power is
also increasingly gaining in attraction and popularity. On several
occasions, the Indonesian Military (TNI) elite has used the term to
explain how the defense force must cope with future multidimensional
threats and challenges. Defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro, for
example, asserted that, “the concept of smart power is principally the
potential synergy of civilian and military”. His deputy, Sjafrie
Sjamsoeddin, spoke of a similar theme, although he inferred it as the
use of power smartly (small but effective and efficient) with due regard
to TNI minimum essential forces (MEF). The TNI commander, followed by
his staff, also expressed the need for smart power implementations.
These
simply demonstrate how the smart power concept has affected the
military leadership in Indonesia as well as within the TNI as an
organization.
According to Joseph S. Nye, who coined the term,
smart power is the right combination of hard and soft elements of power
in order to achieve the national goals. At first, it was for
compensating for limited usage of the US hard power in the contemporary
political realm. Nye asserts that the US cannot rely merely on its
military and economic might. Moreover, he believes that a US
heavy-handed posture may not only be ineffective but also may backfire,
hurting the US interests, as the interdependency among states has been
growing even larger.
In contrast, Nye offers the manipulation of
such interdependency by the optimization of the US “co-optive power”
derived from ideological and cultural attraction as well as
institutional credibility — namely, soft power. He even confirms that
soft power may become the new instrument of power (IoP), just like the
prior grouping of elements of national power, DIME (diplomacy,
information, military and economy). With the right proportion and timing
application between hard and soft power, comes the new form of power:
smart power.
As we know, TNI is the hard power resource. The question now is whether TNI has soft power that can form smart power.
The thesis built here is that TNI may have soft power as a capability for at least three reasons.
First,
Indonesia secured independence through (or mostly known) armed
struggle. In this case, the role of TNI was so vital and central that
Indonesia’s independence seemed impossible without it. In other words,
TNI history shapes Indonesian history as a whole.
Furthermore,
there is a TNI ideal, which is transferred from generation to
generation: TNI is the strongest unifying force that stands above all
Indonesians in their inherent diversity. This also has made the TNI
persona so popular. One example is the way former high-ranking TNI
personnel are able to occupy many eminent public posts, although
contemporary Indonesia falls under civilian supremacy. With the 2014
election drawing closer, several surveys show that presidential
candidates with military backgrounds lead in the popularity rating.
Second,
it is so fortunate for TNI that Indonesia is a hierarchical society
originated from previous kingdoms. The knights, soldiers or military in
the contemporary sense, are a prominent class within society. This
cultural characteristic was amplified by the Indonesian war-dominated
history. Even after independence, the soldier class has dominated
Indonesian culture for more than four decades (prior to the Reform era).
As a result, the military still characterizes the new
Indonesian democracy. This is apparent in how political parties
structure their organizations, which treat their party leaders like the
military commander. The easiest observation is the way political parties
dress up their so-called task force with military-like camouflage and
berets. In the soft power context, such cultural attraction equals
co-optive power or an entry point to have the other act according to our
own agenda.
Third, although in contemporary Indonesia, the
military is already out of politics, TNI still has an inescapable
political influence because of its institutional environs. The simplest
explanation is like this. TNI has more than 600,000 members that have at
least five people with an affectionate or emotional connection. With
the Indonesia kinship society model, for example, wife, children,
parents, siblings and those who are akin that see the TNI member in
their (extended) family as a role model. Hence, 3 million people or
almost 2 percent of the population are TNI sympathizers.
TNI used
to be political power. Although it has stopped, the infrastructure is
still intact within society. For example, the army has a territorial
structure that ranges from provincial level down to every village. Those
TNI-civilian interfaces have existed long enough among the people so
that they have become focal points for solving social issues. Therefore,
it is unsurprising that people sometimes also go to the local military
authority, rather than police, when facing security problems.
Such sympathy and legitimacy, both are the source of soft power.
The
three reasons above confirm that TNI has soft power. TNI can enhance
those sources of power up to the next level to realize power as outcome.
Several developing methods are: reintroducing TNI values upon the
people; organizational transparency that is free from corruption, public
audits, not being too sensitive in sharing information, opening bases
for public usage and active participation in solving social issues.
Within the near future, it is possible to reconsider TNI participation
in the presidential election or a TNI justice system for civilians.
In
conclusion, since TNI may possess soft power then it may also have
smart power. TNI soft power will act as an enhancer and an enabler for
its hard power. If all civilian agencies agree that TNI’s character is
the role model for their member’s character building, and the money for
doing so is around 5 percent of their budget, TNI virtually will save 5
percent of its spending.
Furthermore, if TNI wins the people’s
legitimacy, it enables TNI to do what is best for TNI since it is also
the best for the people. This is actually how smart power works.
The
writer has a master’s degree in maritime policy from the University of
Wollongong, Australia, and a postgraduate diploma in strategic studies
from Massey University, New Zealand.
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